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The 1960's and 1970's are gone, and with them that brief 
period in which a progressive Supreme Court expanded the pro-
tections of the Constitution in the face of contrary majority 
views. Increasingly, scholars question whether this description is 
even accurate, whether the federal courts did act in a 
countermajoritarian fashiont and whether they were able to or 
did much to effect social change beyond that accomplished in the 
political process.z But something unique in judicial history did 
seem to have happened during the era of the Warren Court. For 
many liberal scholars, this time was Camelot. 
Larry Yackle is one of those scholars. In his recent, pene-
trating book on federal jurisdiction, Yackle plainly yearns for 
those lost golden days. The problem, as Yackle sees it, is that 
"[t]he Supreme Court's decisions in recent years have taken far 
too much decision-making authority away from the federal 
courts and given it to the courts of the states. In that process, the 
federal courts have lost the capacity to check the great power of 
government in American society." Yackle paints the current is-
sue in the law of federal jurisdiction as "a heated ideological de-
bate between those I will dare call 'liberals,' who almost always 
prefer the federal courts in cases in which federal rights must be 
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determined, and those I will call 'conservatives,' who typically 
urge that the state courts be employed." "Lest there be any 
doubt," he proclaims with apparent pride, "I am a liberal." 
Yackle not only yearns for bygone days, he comes with a 
prescription to return to them. To meet the threat that Yackle 
sees, "Congress should enact a series of new statutes to reclaim 
the federal courts for their vital role in this constitutional democ-
racy." While much of his book is a detailed "internal critique" of 
the rightward trend of federal jurisdiction, each chapter con-
cludes with a specific statutory suggestion to address the criti-
cisms he levels. Some of the legislation Yackle seeks would be 
new, or would implement reform proposals long ignored by Con-
gress, such as the extension of federal question jurisdiction be-
yond the bounds of the Mottley well-pleaded complaint rule.3 
But much of Yackle's legislative agenda quite obviously is 
designed to reverse the restrictions placed upon the exercise of 
federal jurisdiction by the Rehnquist Court. 
I will have my questions to ask about Yackle's agenda, about 
where it is he is going, why he wants to go there, and whether his 
agenda will get him where he wants to go. Despite my questions, 
however, make no mistake about the value of this book. Re-
claiming the Federal Courts is a passionate piece of work by a 
scholar who cares deeply about the use of the law, and courts, to 
ease the plight of the victims of government excess. It is popular 
in these times to worry about the victims of government excess,4 
but the populace seldom seems concerned when government ex-
cess threatens individual liberties, particularly when the liberties 
at stake are those of individuals who "are either unpopular in 
themselves (for example, the rights of criminal defendants) or 
are asserted by unpopular people (for example, political dissent-
ers)." In any society that dares to call itself free, these people 
need champions, and their champions are the guardians of the 
liberty of all of us. Yackle is one of these champions. 
Yackle particularly deserves credit for the mission he ac-
cepts, that of unmasking the arcane law of federal jurisdiction to 
reveal its impact on substantive rights. Yackle leaves to others 
the "diminution of individual liberty that has attended the com-
ing of the Rehnquist Court." While he addresses the "erosion of 
federal rights indirectly," his ground is the "[d]eadly dry and con-
3. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
4. This, in part, seems to be the concern of the Contract with America. E.g., Ed 
Gillespie and Bob Schellhas, eds., Contract With America 125 (Times Books, 1994) ("Isn't 
it time we got Washington off our backs?"). 
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fusing doctrines" that we call the law of federal jurisdiction. 
Yackle cogently attacks this technical body of law with force and 
vision, making the impact of jurisdictional decisions plain for all 
to see. 
Following an introduction, there are essentially two parts to 
Yackle's book. There is a first chapter in which Yackle sets the 
stage, detailing the debate over the relative parity of federal and 
state courts, and reviewing the history that leads Yackle to con-
clude we have come to favor a "Legal Process" model of federal 
jurisdiction. In this chapter, Yackle expresses his evident disdain 
for what he sees to be the Legal Process argument that litigation 
in any court is as good as the next. Rather, it is his preference 
that "federal question cases []be in federal court." What follows 
are four chapters treating, in this order, justiciability, federal 
question jurisdiction, abstention, and habeas corpus. In each 
chapter Yackle ably describes the doctrinal development, criti-
cizes it, and concludes with a legislative proposal that would 
open wide the doors of the federal courts. Indeed, no mere pro-
posals are these; Yackle actually has drafted the necessary 
statutes. 
While Yackle's legislative agenda is designed to answer 
questions about what the law of federal jurisdiction should be, in 
reality the book raises far more questions than it answers. That, 
in and of itself, might be a good thing. The questions raised, 
however, are troubling in a way that extends far beyond this 
book to the entire endeavor of federal jurisdiction scholarship. 
Yackle is stuck in a time warp, as are many of the scholars that 
write in the area of federal jurisdiction. Yackle criticizes the 
Legal Process methodology, but in a sense he is trapped in it, as 
are his contemporaries.s 
The problem finds its root, and all too often its branch, in 
Hart and Wechsler's seminal federal jurisdiction casebook. As 
Akhil Amar has observed, the book was out of date almost at the 
time it was published.6 Writing before Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 1 and much of the work of the Warren Court, the Hart and 
Wechsler approach maintains an almost naive belief that state 
5. For an interesting recent debate about the utility of the Hart and Wechsler para· 
digm, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 Vand. 
L. Rev. 953 (1994); Michael Wells, Busting the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 11 Const. 
Comm. 557 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Comparing Federal Courts "Paradigms," 12 
Const. Comm. 3 (1995). See also Mary Brigid McManamon, Challenging the Hart and 
Wechsler Paradigm, 27 Conn. L. Rev. 833 (1995). 
6. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 688, 703 (1989). 
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). As I completed this article, I relied on the current (third) 
edition of the Hart and Wechsler case book for citations. In the current edition Brown is 
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and federal courts are fungible, and a now counter-historical po-
sition that state courts are the ultimate guardians of constitu-
tional liberty. That might once have been, and may be again, but 
as Yackle ably points out, during the Warren era the federal 
courts were the ones that mattered to civil libertarians, and the 
differences between state and federal courts often were vast. 
Thus, Yackle's gripe with Hart and Wechsler is that they assumed 
"there was nothing to choose between the federal and state 
courts. There was something to be explored and decided. Hart 
and Wechsler ducked the really fundamental question." 
The disappointment is that Yackle, like many federal juris-
diction scholars, has done little more than decide the parity ques-
tion in favor of federal courts. Moreover, Yackle seems to do so 
from within, rather than without, the Legal Process model. 
Refighting old battles with new (or, for that matter, old) prem-
ises may not have much to do with today's landscape. Yackle's 
book is a thorough repudiation of the current state of the law of 
federal jurisdiction, but ultimately the book falls short of pre-
scribing what I believe is a pertinent agenda for the future. 
I, like Yackle, have an internal and external critique. Ini-
tially, I identify what seem to be five fundamental difficulties 
with Yackle's own agenda. Then, I map out briefly the directions 
I believe federal jurisdiction scholarship should move to take us 
into the next century. 
First, Yackle's legislative agenda seems poorly designed to 
address what really concerns him, the vindication of federal 
rights. In large part the poor fit between agenda and problem 
finds its root in a certain schizophrenia to Yackle's project. At 
times, Yackle says his concern is seeing that federal rights be vin-
dicated in federal courts.s At other times, Yackle says he wants 
federal questions resolved in federal courts.9 The two are not the 
same, however. 
While it is evident Yackle's real goal is enforcement of fed-
eral civil rights, sweeping all federal questions into federal courts 
will only limit the availability of federal courts to do what Yackle 
mentioned but three times, none significantly. See Bator, et. al., The Federal Courts and 
the Federal System (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 1988). 
8. E.g., Larry W. Yackle, Reclaiming the Federal Courts 4 (Harvard U. Press, 1994) 
("The federal courts are under siege and can be rescued, and federal rights with 
them, ... "); id. at 9 (" 'liberals,' who almost always prefer the federal courts in cases in 
which federal rights must be determined, ... "). 
9. E.g., id. at 3 ("I begin with the ,arguments supporting a preference for federal 
courts in cases implicating federal legal questions."); id. at 12 ("I have said that liberals 
generally prefer the federal courts in federal question cases."). 
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wants. As Yackle observes, federal judicial resources are limited. 
Yet, Yackle calls for sweeping federal jurisdiction in almost every 
instance. Take, for example, his chapter on "arising under" juris-
diction. He proposes that the federal courts "shall have jurisdic-
tion of any civil action in which it appears that the determination 
or application of a substantial question of federal law can resolve 
the dispute between the parties." Further, "[i]t shall be sufficient 
if the complaint ... advances a claim for relief in which the fed-
eral question is an essential element." Under Yackle's proposed 
statute "the federal district courts would have jurisdiction in a 
case like Merrell Dow."1o Merrell Dow was a case in which plain-
tiffs brought a product liability action involving the drug Bendec-
tin in state court. One of their causes of action alleged 
negligence for violating the labeling requirements of the federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. On the basis of that claim, de-
fendants removed the action to federal court. The Supreme 
Court held removal was inappropriate. 
Whether cases like Merrell Dow belong in federal court is a 
difficult and interesting question, but it is mystifying why ensur-
ing they can be there is part of Yackle's agenda. To the contrary, 
one might suppose that Yackle would not want numerous state 
tort actions to crowd out plaintiffs with federal rights claims. 
Similarly, Yackle essentially would reverse most abstention doc-
trines, including Burfordu abstention, a doctrine that requires 
federal courts to defer to certain state administrative proceed-
ings. Burford itself would have involved the federal courts in 
complicated proceedings to determine where oil wells could be 
drilled, yet the federal claims in the case were quite tenuous. The 
problem, as I discuss later, is one of resource allocation. If pro-
tecting federal rights is the goal, moving all federal questions to 
federal court hardly seems the solution. 
Almost odder than what Yackle includes, however, is what 
he ignores. For example, Yackle fails to tackle the Eleventh 
Amendment. Similarly, he has little to say about judicially fash-
ioned immunity doctrines.12 Both these doctrinal areas present 
huge obstacles to full relief for those whose federal rights were 
10. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986). Yackle at 
251 n.45 (cited in note 8). Yackle does agree Congress could explicitly provide that no 
such jurisdiction exists for private lawsuits to enforce the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 
Yackle at 251 (cited in note 8). 
11. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
12. This may be because strictly speaking these doctrines are not jurisdictional, but 
at other times Yackle does not adhere to this distinction. See Yackle at 177-84 (cited in 
note 8) (discussing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and the doctrine of retroactivity). 
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violated. At the same time, even under existing "arising under" 
jurisdictional rules, the plaintiffs Yackle really cares about, like 
Richard Steffel,13 already get into federal court. Yackle seems to 
have adopted a "more is better" approach, rather than designing 
his strategy to fit his ideological goal. 
Second, even if Yackle's agenda is the correct one, it is en-
tirely unclear why he thinks there is any hope of getting Congress 
to go along. The best example here is habeas corpus jurisdiction. 
Yackle is one of the nation's preeminent advocates of the Great 
Writ, and the proposals in his book would overturn many of the 
barriers to relief imposed by the Supreme Court. He writes, 
however, at a time when habeas corpus jurisdiction has been 
under consistent and severe attack in Congress. As I write, Con-
gress appears poised to take action to curtail the writ. While 
I share many of Yackle's beliefs with regard to habeas jurisdic-
tion, he might have recommended something with greater plausi-
bility. Much of the book shares this aura of the Utopian yet 
unachievable. 
Third, even if Yackle could get his proposals through Con-
gress, it is unclear why he thinks Congress necessarily is better 
than the courts at allocating federal jurisdiction to achieve the 
goals he wishes. Yackle takes me to task for suggesting that the 
formulation of federal jurisdiction is or ought to be a shared en-
deavor between the federal courts and Congress.t4 But Congress 
13. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). Yackle begins the "arising under" 
chapter with Steffel's story. These case-based vignettes at the start of each chapter are an 
effective teaching tool, but in this case the choice of story is telling. Steffel involved a 
plaintiff who carne to federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that a threatened state 
prosecution for handbilling against the Vietnam war violated his first amendment rights. 
The federal courts took jurisdiction, and even declined to abstain although Steffel's com-
panion was being prosecuted. I have always had some difficulty squaring cases like Stef-
fel, seeking a declaration that a state law prosecution would violate federal rights, with 
cases like Franchise of California Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 
(1983) and Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950). Those latter 
cases seem to hold that "[i]f, but for the availability of the declaratory judgment proce-
dure, the federal claim would arise only as a defense to a state created action, jurisdiction 
is lacking." Charles A. Wright, et. al., lOA Federal Practice and Procedure§ 2767 at 744-
45 (West, 2d ed. 1983) (quoted in Yackle at 111 (cited in note 8)). Yackle seems to share 
my difficulty, though he valiantly tries to reconcile the lines. Yackle at 110-12 (cited in 
note 8). Yackle ultimately would reject the Skelly Oil rule, but what is ironic is that 
Yackle would bring Tax Board and Skelly-in which federal civil rights are not in-
volved-into federal court, while Steffel already is there. 
14. Yackle at 138 (cited in note 8). Actually, Yackle focuses too much on one foot-
note I have written, ignoring to some extent the point of the broader work. In A Different 
Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 
(1990), I argue that the Constitution should be read as granting shared power to Congress 
and the Supreme Court to define the extent of federal jurisdiction. I briefly muse that if 
the Constitution is interpreted to permit Congress to foist jurisdiction upon the federal 
courts, perhaps Congress can restrict that jurisdiction as well. My narrow point simply 
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necessarily must paint with a broad brush. Yackle's own sugges-
tions would, as I have observed, flood the federal courts. Shared 
jurisdictional authority permits the courts to curtail excessive ju-
risdictional grants. That is not to say that judicial jurisdictional 
decisions are always wise ones, and, when the courts stray from 
the ideal, further congressional legislation may be in order. That 
"dialogue" is the central point of the article Yackle discusses. 
But Yackle's own example of the history of statutory federal 
question jurisdiction suggests that simply to let Congress make 
the decisions might overwhelm the courts with cases, taking up 
judicial resources needed to address Yackle's real concern. 
Fourth, and related, it is unclear how Yackle can really be-
lieve that drafting statutes like the ones he has will compel fed-
eral courts to do as he wishes. The history of federal jurisdiction 
is replete with examples of the Supreme Court creatively inter-
preting statutes to achieve the goal it wishes. The federal ques-
tion statute is one notorious example. Another is the habeas 
corpus statute, whose language has meant many things at differ-
ent times, depending upon the proclivities of the Justices. 
Yackle's answers seem to be "clarity" in drafting and his proposal 
for a catchall provision that requires jurisdictional statutes to be 
"construed in a manner most favorable to the immediate adjudi-
cation of federal claims in federal court." But one person's clar-
ity is another's ambiguity, as is evident from Yackle's somewhat 
astonishing conclusion that "§ 1983[] is an express exception to 
the Anti-Injunction Act, .... "1s Taking Yackle's federal ques-
tion statute as an example, how clear is it to mandate federal 
jurisdiction if a federal question is "an essential element" of a 
claim for relief? Was the federal question in Merrell Dow "es-
sential" when the complaint spelled out several claims, and the 
claim in question was essentially one of state law? I can easily 
see the Supreme Court holding otherwise. 
was to question the soundness of the position taken by some scholars that the granting 
and restricting powers are not governed by the same rules. My broader point was that 
there is a constitutional tension between congressional and Supreme Court power over 
jurisdiction that is resolved as a practical matter on a case-by-case basis, as the Court 
decides whether it must acquiesce in congressional pronouncements, or can exercise crea-
tive statutory construction to avoid conclusions that seem an inappropriate allocation of 
jurisdictional authority. While Yackle does not like the jurisdictional conclusions of the 
present Supreme Court, the Warren Court seems testament to the idea that at times judi-
cial flexibility may serve to protect rights. Thus, I am uncertain why Yackle disagrees 
with my conclusions (although I also recognize I am being used as a foil). 
15. Yackle at 126 (cited in note 8). As I have observed elsewhere, on its face § 1983 
gives "absolutely no clue of being such an exception." Friedman, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 18 
(cited in note 14). Yackle's support, ironically, is not the statute, but the Supreme Court 
decision in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). Yackle at 259 n.32 (cited in note 8). 
448 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 12:441 
Fifth, and most important, it is very difficult to understand 
why Yackle necessarily wants to force the federal courts to de-
cide the cases he cares about. Yackle states that "there is a rela-
tionship between rights themselves and the courts available to 
enforce them," but is far too uncritical of exactly what the rela-
tionship is. For this reason, Yackle's solution is to mandate the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction in almost every case. There may 
be a virtue to the "passive virtues," however." It is common cur-
rency, accepted by Yackle, that decisions denying justiciability 
generally reflect hostility to claims on the merits. Put another 
way, if you force the courts to decide in many cases they find 
nonjusticiable, they are likely to decide against claims of federal 
right. Given this, why force the decision at all, when one could 
hope the case for justiciability could be more effectively made (or 
more sympathetically heard) when the courts are more open to 
the validity of the claim on the merits? 
While these five concerns indicate the problematic nature of 
Yackle's approach, I think they all follow from a larger problem, 
one to which I alluded earlier, and one that haunts much of the 
scholarship in this area. The problem is that the entire corpus of 
work is inexorably driven by the parity debate, which in tum re-
sults from the seminal nature of Hart and Wechsler's legal-pro-
cess-oriented work. Applying legal process principles, Hart and 
Wechsler did assume a certain fungibility of state and federal 
courts, a fungibility that was evidently problematic during the 
Warren Court era. Because Hart and Wechsler's work was semi-
nal and because its underlying premise was problematic, a ten-
sion arose which scholars are trying to resolve to this day: Is it 
possible to adhere to the Hart and Wechsler approach while dis-
agreeing with their resolution of the parity question (and there-
fore with many of their conclusions)?16 This tension presents 
itself repeatedly in today's federal jurisdiction scholarship. In 
some instances, the tension manifests itself in an explicit debate 
about the parity question.17 More frequently, old battles simply 
16. It may be unfair to lump Hart and Wechsler together here. The casebook itself 
is a teaching tool, more suggestive of answers than definitive. It is not at all clear that the 
two agreed on conclusions, as their other work makes clear. For example, Wechsler 
seemingly would give Congress much more control over federal jurisdiction than Hart. 
Compare Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L Rev. 1001 
(1965) with Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit The Jurisdiction of Fed-
eral Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L Rev. 1362 (1953). See Friedman, 85 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. at 31 n.173 (cited in note 14) (discussing how Hart's and Wechsler's positions 
diverge). 
17. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Fed-
eral Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 233 (1988); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant 
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are refought over the same ground Hart and Wechsler plowed.18 
This latter approach is evident in Yackle's choice of subject mat-
ter: justiciability,19 abstention, federal question jurisdiction, and 
habeas corpus. 
1\vo problems permeate much of current federal jurisdiction 
scholarship. First, parity is not a fixed concept and, second, Hart 
and Wechsler's agenda, while pertinent, does not necessarily de-
fine what should be our own. The challenge we face is to develop 
an agenda for the law of federal jurisdiction that will take us into 
the next century. Part of that challenge is recognizing how the 
mutability of the parity question should affect old questions. The 
other part is recognizing what the new questions are that deserve 
attention. 
The parity question is not as simple or straightforward as 
Yackle or others make it. While the federal courts were unques-
tionably the place to be in the 1960's and 1970's, that has not 
always been true in the past and may not be true today. Looking 
backward, the nationalizing Supreme Court under John Marshall 
was hero in some respects, but certainly villain when it came to 
the Alien and Sedition Acts. During the Lochner Era, both state 
and federal courts proved their recalcitrance, but it is debatable 
which court system was the real problem.zo Northern state 
Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment On Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional 
Rights, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 329 (1988}. 
18. I may be equally guilty here. Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Absten-
tion, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 530 (1989}; Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 Minn. L. 
Rev. 247 (1988). I am not without countless companions, however. In the last few years, 
the AALS Section on Federal Courts program has treated the parity debate (Symposium: 
Federalism and Parity, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 593-664 (1991}}, habeas corpus (The Future of 
Habeas Corpus: Reflections on Teague v. Lane and Beyond, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2331-2531 
(1993)), and federal common law making (Federal Courts Symposium, 12 Pace L. Rev. 
227-357 (1992}). 
19. Actually, justiciability-although it does pose the question of access to the fed-
eral courts-does not, strictly speaking, flow from the parity debate. Because many state 
courts also apply justiciability doctrines, a non-justiciable controversy may be barred from 
any court. Thus, in a sense, Yackle's treatment of justiciability seems a little out of place. 
20. See, e.g., Melvin I. Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation During the 
Progressive Era: A Reevaluation, 72 J. Amer. Hist. 63,64 (1985) (recognizing state courts 
seen as even more reactionary than Supreme Court, but arguing that "with only a few 
exceptions, state courts moved consistently toward approval of a wide range of reform 
legislation"); Howard Gillman, The Constitution Beseiged 160-65 (Duke U. Press, 1993) 
(discussing state court upholding of minimum wage laws, and Supreme Court striking of 
such a law in Adkins v. Children's Hospital). Recall that the federal courts were attacked 
for standing in the way of progress, and the attack was fueled by United States Supreme 
Court decisions overturning favorable decisions of state courts. E.g., Traux v. Corrigan, 
257 U.S. 312 (1921) (overturning Arizona state decision permitting picketing in labor con-
troversy); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (overturning New York state decision 
upholding maximum hour law for bakers). 
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courts faced off with the Supreme Court over slavery.z1 Parity 
(or disparity) inevitably is a shifting concept. But the problem is 
even more complicated, for the nature of rights being protected 
also changes. While it is debatable whether federal or state 
courts were more protective of federal rights during the Lochner 
Era,zz it is certain Yackle does not think any court should have 
been protecting those federal constitutional rights.z3 Ex Parte 
Young, a rights-protective jurisdictional decision, was protective 
of economic rights.z4 Similarly, state courts challenged federal 
courts on the slavery issue, but the federal court position was in 
favor of the federal right to the return of fugitive slaves. Those 
who prefer federal courts to vindicate federal rights also have a 
selective view of what those rights should be. Given the chang-
ing nature of the rights protected by courts, and the changing 
susceptibility of court systems to claims of right, there is limited 
utility in any jurisdictional theory that always prefers one court 
system. 
Jurisdictional theory must account, somehow, with both the 
changing approaches of state and federal courts and the changing 
nature of rights. While this phenomenon does not necessarily 
undermine keeping the federal courts open, it does raise new sets 
of questions. Yackle criticizes Erwin Chemerinsky's "litigant 
choice"zs solution to the parity problem, but Chemerinsky seems 
correct, even if one is not persuaded by the tone of his argument. 
If rights protection is the issue, more courts and more constitu-
tions are the right direction, not simply pushing cases into federal 
court. What may be wrong are doctrines like Pennhurst, which 
keep federal courts from entertaining joint federal-state constitu-
tional challenges to state action.z6 The relevant question is, as-
sessing all the cases that might be brought, which ones make 
most sense in which forum? There are implications here for di-
versity jurisdiction, for review of state administrative proceed-
ings, and even for hearing fundamental rights claims. Many state 
courts recently have demonstrated a willingness to protect rights 
that far exceeds that of the federal courts. Civil liberties lawyer 
21. E.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859). 
22. See supra note 22. 
23. Yackle at 23 (cited in note 8) ("they chose the wrong rights to protect"). 
24. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See James W. Ely, Jr., The Chief Justice-
ship of Melville W. Fuller, 1888-1910 at 184 (U. of South Carolina Press, 1995) (discussing 
Ex Parte Young's protection of property rights and Progressive's unhappiness with the 
decision). 
25. See Yackle at 42-43 (cited in note 8), discussing Chemerinsky, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 
at 33 (cited in note 17). 
26. Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
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today are going to think long and hard about which court system 
to use, at least in states in which the state constitution is being 
revitalized. 
At bottom, jurisdiction is an allocative decision. The task is 
to identify the claims that might be brought and assign them to 
the tribunals most suited to addressing those claims. These tribu-
nals do not simply include state and federal courts, but private 
tribunals for alternate dispute resolution and numerous and vary-
ing state and federal administrative courts. Questions of ideol-
ogy assuredly are relevant in making these allocative decisions, 
but so are questions of cost and accessibility. 
Moreover, jurisdictional allocation has to take place against 
the backdrop of the pressing problems of the moment. Protec-
tion of constitutional rights deservedly is a paramount considera-
tion.27 But there are many other problems that a sensible 
jurisdictional scheme must take into account. Civil justice is be-
coming beyond the financial grasp of ordinary citizens. Newly 
created federal offenses are swamping the federal courts. A 
good deal of civil enforcement is taking place at the administra-
tive level, and under programs of cooperative federalism many of 
these cases (which may involve federal rights) have their start in 
administrative agencies. 
The changing nature of the parity question, and the plethora 
of new problems that confront us, suggest that the law of federal 
jurisdiction needs to confront itself with much more than the 
problems stated in Hart and Wechsler's terms and played out 
endlessly today. Federal courts scholars need to turn their atten-
tion to these new problems. While some are doing so,zs too 
much time is being spent on rethinking old problems in old 
27. Even with regard to constitutional rights, the bulk of these cases are criminal 
cases that inevitably will be litigated in state court. Habeas corpus is little answer, given 
the minuscule number of cases in which the writ is granted. See Daniel J. Meltzer, 
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2507, 2524 (1993). 
Professor Bator argued persuasively long ago that state courts inescapably will play a 
central and continuing role in the adjudication of federal rights claims. Paul M. Bator, 
The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 605 
(1981). 
28. Much of Judith Resnik's work addresses new concerns facing federal courts. 
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal 
Trial Couns, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 909 (1990). Ann Althouse has shown even old subjects can 
be addressed from quite a different perspective. Ann Althouse, Standing, In Fluffy Slip-
pers, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1177 (1991). As part of a symposium on the Future of Federal Courts 
Scholarship and Teaching, Resnik and Althouse recently provided perspectives on possi-
ble new directions in federal jurisdiction scholarship. Judith Resnik, Rereading 'The Fed-
eral Couns': Revising the Domain of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the 
Twentieth Century, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1021 (1994); Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions 
in the Han and Wechshler Hotel, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 993 (1994). 
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terms. Federal courts scholars should join civil procedure schol-
ars in thinking of ways to streamline civil justice and best utilize 
limited federal resources. They should join criminal law scholars 
in addressing the proper use of federal criminal authority. They 
should be concerned with gender and race bias in the courts. 
Even in the area of enforcing constitutional rights it may be time 
to devise new procedures or courts that make it easier for plain-
tiffs to have their claims heard quickly and cheaply. Not every 
civil rights suit is a pathbreaking public law action, but the pro-
hibitive cost of litigation may forestall claims being heard, 
notwithstanding the availability of attorneys' fees. 
Moreover, in addressing these new areas, federal courts 
scholars need to open themselves up to the work being done in 
other disciplines. The parity question itself raises overtones of 
institutional choice, yet little federal courts scholarship draws 
from the insights of public choice, game theory, or law and eco-
nomics generally. Federal courts scholarship has proven itself re-
markably insular, perhaps for reasons of the intricacy of the 
doctrine making it inaccessible or uninteresting to scholars 
outside the field. But federal courts scholars should seek to ap-
ply these tools to our own discipline. 
This is admittedly a gangly, open-ended plea for innovation 
and redirection. That is because the issues and problems that 
confront court systems these days are gangly and open-ended. 
But sorting out the problems of the next century are where our 
efforts should be. There is something mystical and Talmudic 
about the winding doctrine of abstention, habeas corpus, jus-
ticiability, and federal question jurisdiction that no doubt draws 
us into the web of Hart and Wechsler's world and keeps us there. 
But if we are to be relevant, we must be forward-looking. The 
1960's are gone, and the future is upon us. 
